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FOREWORD
Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Employing Talent is the last of six monographs focused upon officer talent management in the U.S. Army.
Here, Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David Lyle, and
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso argue
that the Army’s current officer employment paradigm
is unequal to the needs of a professional, volunteer
Army facing the twin challenges of a competitive labor market and an increasingly complex global operating environment. The authors then explain the ways
in which optimal employment theories, information
age tools, and well-regulated market mechanisms can
generate better talent matches, making the Officer
Corps far more productive.
As the employment of talented officers is a necessary component of any future Officer Corps strategy,
the theories discussed in this monograph merit close
attention.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

v

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
CASEY WARDYNSKI is Director of the Office of
Economic and Manpower Analysis and an Associate
Professor of Economics at the United States Military
Academy, West Point, NY. In addition to creating
the concepts for the “America’s Army” game and
the Army’s pre-commissioning retention incentives,
Colonel Wardynski has published in the area of
military compensation policy and manpower. Colonel
Wardynski earned a B.S. at West Point, a Masters in
Public Policy at Harvard, and a Ph.D. in Policy Analysis
from the Rand Graduate School.
DAVID S. LYLE is an Associate Professor of Economics
and Deputy Director of the Office of Economic and
Manpower Analysis at the United States Military
Academy, West Point, NY. He has publications in
the Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of Labor
Economics, the Review of Economics and Statistics,
the American Economic Journal: Applied, and the
Economics of Education Review. Major Lyle earned a
B.S. at West Point and a Ph.D. in Economics from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
MICHAEL J. COLARUSSO is a research analyst in
the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis at
the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.
He is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and has
served in a variety of military positions, to include as
an Assistant Professor of History at West Point. Mr.
Colarusso earned a B.A. in History from Saint John’s
University and a M.A. in History from the Pennsylvania
State University.

vi

SUMMARY
In the Information Age, jobs are becoming more
complex, requiring employees who are agile, inventive, and empathetic. Work is increasingly characterized by high levels of task interdependence, skill
specificity, and uncertainty. In addition, today’s
enormously competitive labor market gives educated
professionals the option of seeking new employment
whenever a company fails to give them sufficient
voice in their work. In short, the industrial era, during
which “bosses” unilaterally made employment decisions, is over.
Today, the most successful enterprises unleash the
talents of their workers by collaborating with them
rather than dictating to them. In this more equitable
environment, prospective employees and employers
seek information about each other. Ideally, they will
enter into mutually beneficial relationships characterized by high productivity and the initiative, innovation, and tenure born of true job satisfaction.
Unfortunately, the Army’s current officer employment paradigm is not talent driven. Instead, it is industrial (almost feudal) in nature, running counter to
best practices. The Army unduly prioritizes “fairness”
when making assignments, has a narrowly defined
pathway to senior leadership ranks, cannot see the
talent it possesses, and suffers from severe principalagent problems.
The Army must move beyond these industrial
era employment practices and adopt information age
talent management. However, creating better talent
matches requires a significant change in its feudal employment culture. Sound theories, inovative technologies, and controlled market mechanisms can help the
vii

Army match individual officer talents with specific
work requirements.
A carefully controlled talent market driven by a
state-of-the-art information technology system can
help create employment practices equal to our times.
It will allow commanders to seek the talent they need,
screen job candidates, and interact with both officers
and Human Resources Command (HRC) personnel
to achieve good matches. In turn, officers will better
know what talents are in demand. This can positively
shape their developmental decisions, future assignment aspirations, and professional networks.
Most importantly, the Army will benefit on several
levels. First, it will finally be able to “see” the talent it
possesses and the talent that is actually in demand.
As talent gaps are revealed, it will be empowered to
allocate officer developmental resources far more efficiently and rapidly. Second, the Army’s Officer Corps
will work in increasingly networked fashion, building
technology-enabled, problem solving relationships.
Finally, optimal talent matches will improve talent
development, enhance productivity, reduce risk and
ensure the Officer Corps has the depth and breadth of
talent it needs, both now and in the future.
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TOWARDS A U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPS
STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS:
EMPLOYING TALENT
INTRODUCTION
In 1911, Frederick Winslow Taylor, a mechanical
engineer, published The Principles of Scientific Management. His premise was that, in general, workers
performed at the slowest rate that goes unpunished,
something he (ironically) referred to as “soldiering.”1
To rectify this, Taylor devised a method for improving
worker productivity. First, the employer would break
skilled labor requirements down into smaller, less
skilled labor tasks. Next, the employer would “scientifically” identify the “one best way” to perform these
smaller tasks to save time and costs. Workers would
then be selected, trained and employed to exacting
task standards.
In an era worshipful of science and in the throes
of industrialization, scientific management, or “Taylorism” as it came to be called, was a tremendous hit.
Bethlehem Steel, Henry Ford, and other manufacturers employed it in their factories, sometimes doubling
or tripling output. Even today, this sort of task-oriented work optimization continues in several industries.
The drawbacks of Taylor’s program, however,
were significant. Chief among them, it failed to recognize that the most efficient way of working for one
person might be inefficient for another. It made work
repetitive, tedious, and uninteresting. It stifled selfdevelopment and smothered employee decisionmaking or innovation. Lastly, it treated people like interchangeable parts, employing just a fraction of their
unique talents.
1

In the Information Age, jobs are becoming more
complex, not less so, requiring employees who are
agile, inventive, and empathetic. Work is increasingly
characterized by high levels of task interdependence,
skill specificity, and uncertainty. In addition, today’s
enormously competitive labor market gives educated
professionals the option of seeking new employment
whenever a company fails to give them sufficient
voice in their work. In short, the industrial era, during
which “bosses” unilaterally made employment decisions, is over.
Today, the most successful enterprises unleash the
full potential of their workers by collaborating with
them rather than dictating to them. In this more equitable environment, prospective employees and employers seek information about each other. Ideally,
they will enter into mutually beneficial relationships
characterized by high productivity and the initiative,
innovation, and tenure born of true job satisfaction.
Employing people optimally is not easy, however.
It requires the ability to access the talent in demand, to
develop it to meet both current and future demands,
and to retain it in an extremely competitive American labor market. If that were not difficult enough,
optimal employment engages the critical component
of timing—getting an employee in position as he approaches the apex of his productive capability in that
position. By this, we mean that both work requirements
and individual talents are always changing—the talent match that may have been optimal 2 or 3 years ago
may become less so over time, either because the requirements have changed, the employee has, or both.
Organizations therefore cannot become complacent—
they must continuously evaluate their talent and their
requirements, ensuring that when warranted, people
2

are afforded new opportunities to make optimal work
contributions.
Effective talent employment is at the core of the
Army Officer Human Capital Model—to provide optimally performing officers in all areas (see Figure 1).
Getting it right directly supports talent development.
It improves job satisfaction, simultaneously increasing talent retention. Moreover, highly productive and
satisfied employees are the ultimate recruiting tool,
making future talent accessions easier.

Figure 1. Army Officer Human Capital Model.
In sum, optimal talent employment expands the
Army’s production possibility frontier—it can do
more with existing resources. It also helps ensure that
the Officer Corps possesses the depth and breadth of
talent needed to meet the twin challenges of a competitive labor market and an increasingly uncertain
operating environment.
3

OFFICER EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES:
OUR BIGGEST AREA OF CONCERN
Throughout this monograph series, we have explored several talent management challenges with
implications for the future well-being of the Officer
Corps. In Volume 3, we discussed the harm caused
by low junior officer retention, a challenge now being
redressed via the Officer Career Satisfaction Program
(OCSP). In Volume 4, we identified accessions practices that not only stunt Army efforts to acquire the officer talent it truly needs, but also rob it of talent needed
elsewhere. In Volume 5, we argued that Army officer
development practices, which for years have received
high marks from most quarters, must keep pace with
emerging challenges via changes in its developmental
culture, education, and evaluation practices.
All of these talent management challenges are cause
for concern, thought, and action. In our opinion, however, the greatest challenge is the one we are focused
upon here—the way the Army employs its officers. Its
current employment paradigm is industrial (almost
feudal) in nature, running counter to best practices.
The Army unduly prioritizes “fairness” when making assignments, has a narrowly defined pathway to
senior leadership ranks, cannot see the talent it possesses, and suffers from severe principal-agent problems. We will explore each of these challenges in turn.
Fairness.
When an officer hears from Human Resources
Command (HRC) about a potential assignment, his or
her pulse quickens. It is an understandable response.
Assignments dictate where the officer will serve for
4

the next 2-4 years, whom he will serve with, and what
he will do. Assignments have an outsized impact upon
an officer’s future advancement opportunities, as well
as upon his or her family and quality of life. Working
through it all can be an emotional process.
For the Army, of course, assignments should
have no emotional component—they are simply the
mechanism through which it derives production from
each officer. Yet, in a well-meaning effort to take care
of its people, the Army’s current officer assignment
process focuses much more upon “fairness” than it
does upon coolly optimizing officer productivity. Instead of talent considerations, each officer’s “dwell”
(nondeployed) time, “boots-on-the-ground” (“BOG”
or deployed) time, number of deployments, and the
number of overseas postings dominate future assignment decisions.
In fact, an HRC branch representative may well begin an officer’s assignment interview with this type of
a comment: Let’s see, you’ve been in CONUS [in the
continental United States] for 3 years—time to get you
back in the fight, or: We need to get you an assignment where you can ‘take a knee’—you’ve had two
overseas deployments in the last 4 years. However,
this way of doing business is problematic, because
it short-circuits talent matching, leads to suboptimal
productivity, increases risks of mission failure, and
demonstrates a skewed notion of fairness.
To be very clear—we support efforts to rest people
after challenging or hazardous assignments, to reunite
families after extended separations, and to provide
equitable deployment exposure. We also wholeheartedly support Army efforts to broaden people (or as
we say, extend their talent advantage) by providing
them with challenging assignments across a variety of
environments. It is necessary to do these things.
5

However, the practice of weighting deployment
exposure more heavily than talent matching when
making assignments is terribly shortsighted. It presumes that officers are interchangeable widgets and
can therefore be treated identically. As we have argued
throughout this monograph series, nothing could be
further from the truth. Each officer is a unique individual, possessing a talent set that aligns far better
with some assignments than with others.
This is why the Army must recalibrate its notions
of fairness. While it must afford equal opportunities
to all, the fairest employment behavior it can engage
in is to assign officers where their talents help defeat
threats at the lowest cost in American lives and taxpayer dollars. This is true fairness—to the taxpayer,
to the Soldiers serving with the officers, and to the
Army’s joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational partners.
Narrow, Tradition-bound Pathways to Success.
A feudal employment culture can prevent an organization from liberating the talent of its people, particularly in emerging threat or technology areas. During
World War I, for example, Brigadier General William
“Billy” Mitchell brilliantly commanded all American
air combat units in France. At war’s end, many expected that General John Pershing would champion
Mitchell as the first military director of the Army’s
Air Service—he was undoubtedly the most talented
senior aviation officer in the Army. Instead, Pershing
chose Major General Charles Menoher, who had capably commanded the 42nd Infantry Division in France.
Some assume Pershing passed over Mitchell due
to his caustic personality.4 But other factors con6

strained Pershing’s options, chiefly the Army’s wellentrenched seniority system. Menoher was an artillery officer and an 1886 West Point graduate, while
Mitchell was a “mustang” Signal Corps officer who
had received a direct commission 20 years later.5 In
short, General Menoher’s source of commission, success as a ground combat branch officer, and far greater
seniority all fit the narrow and traditional pathways to
senior officership that predominated at the time, even
though he had no air service experience.6 As a result,
his assignment was a poor talent match, and Menoher
was relieved as Air Service director in 1921. He eventually returned to division and later corps command,
where he performed honorably and well.7
Pershing’s “Mitchell or Menoher” dilemma highlights what can happen when seniority, traditional
personnel management techniques, and misplaced
notions of fairness supplant talent in the employment
process. Such practices can have negative implications at all levels. In this instance, both individual
and organizational performance were suboptimized.
The Army’s Air Service experienced a tumultuous 2
years, during which its director and deputy were continuously at loggerheads. Over the same period, the
Army failed to fully benefit from Menoher’s talent as
a ground forces commander or Mitchell’s as an airpower innovator.
Unfortunately, remnants of this century-old employment culture remain in the Army today, restricting its ability to effectively employ officers. As we
highlighted in our previous monograph, nearly 80
percent of the Army’s senior leader assignments require talent in more than just the operational art.8
Despite this, the Army’s relatively narrow, traditionbound paths to enterprise leadership heavily transit
7

operational assignments and draw almost exclusively
upon “maneuver, fires, and effects” officers (primarily
combat arms).
This is appropriate in some instances, of course,
but less so in others. As the range of national security
threats becomes increasingly asymmetric and nonkinetic, winnowing talent by shunting it down narrow
career paths will deny the Army the talent needed to
meet those challenges. Success in warfighting, nationbuilding, disaster relief, and myriad other contingencies requires an organizational breadth of talent that
can be sustained only by creating more pathways to
enterprise leadership.
An uncertain threat environment also demands a
certain depth of talent. The Army’s existing officer employment practices, however, frustrate the development of depth, particularly for its more senior officers.
As officers achieve greater rank and responsibility,
their formal development time is increasingly sparse.9
To redress this, on the job training and experience—
tenure—becomes critical. This is standard practice in
most successful enterprises. Optimally performing
employees remain in position long enough to extend
their talents and become true innovators. Army culture generally frowns upon tenure, however, characterizing it as “homesteading.” This “up and out” employment mindset stifles innovation and hampers the
Army’s ability to develop deeply talented people.
The Army Cannot See its Talent.
Even if the Army acknowledges that every officer is
unique, it will be unable to manage their individual talents until it knows what they are and what talents are
needed. Currently, it has little information in this area.
8

Make no mistake—the Army knows plenty about
its officers: their home of record, gender, race, marital
status, colleges attended, blood type, and religion. It
tracks his health and fitness levels, months deployed,
awards, and decorations. It knows many other things
as well—the number and type of training courses
completed, positions held, dates of promotion, and
security clearance levels. All of this information, and
more, is found in each officer’s record brief (ORB).
Unfortunately, this is simple accounting data. To
manage officer talent, however, the Army needs decision support data, information that reveals what makes
each officer tick. What does he value? What opportunities does he desire? What incentives will he respond
to? What does he know that the Army has not taught
him? Where has he been that the Army has not sent
him? What does he enjoy? How does he see the future? How does he learn? In other words, what are his
(or her) talents?
Ironically, web applications such as Plaxo, Monster,
or LinkedIn often know more about participating officers’ talents than the Army does. These networks are
flourishing because they motivate people to volunteer
vast amounts of professional information via friendly
and intuitive user interfaces. As a result, that information is usually current, relevant, and fully searchable,
a key advantage over Army personnel information
management systems. “Web 2.0” sites are also lightning fast relative to most Army web applications,
another advantage. Additionally, they incorporate
inference technology—the ability to learn about users
through continuous interaction and to provide them
with increasingly useful and personalized service.
With these tools, civilian employers have gained a
real advantage over the Army in the talent wars. Not
9

only can they see each participating officer’s talents,
but they can attract them to their organizations via
detailed job postings. Today’s Army officers can use
nimble online search tools to find thousands of private sector jobs demanding their talents. This market
transparency is in stark contrast to the Army’s highly
opaque, top-down employment approach, a likely
contributor to talent leakage from the Officer Corps.
The “Principal-Agent” Problem.
In addition to knowing which talents it has on
hand, the Army must also understand which talents
are in demand across its organizations. Commanders know which talents they need and officers know
which talents they can provide. Unfortunately, neither
makes assignments—the Army’s HRC does, creating
a significant principal-agent problem. This arises when
two parties do not share the same information and
also have differing interests.10
In this case, commanders (the principals), are
charged with leading their organizations to successful
outcomes. They desire “ace” job candidates—officers
who can dramatically exceed minimal performance
requirements because there is a high correlation between their talents and work requirements. When
making assignments, however, HRC’s branch managers (the agents) have no real mechanism for determining which specific talents commanders are seeking, or
how large a supply of it exists in the Officer Corps.
To make matters worse, HRC’s interests often lie
outside those of commanders. Talented, dedicated,
and extremely hard working, HRC’s branch managers
and assignment officers administer a system seeking
a fair distribution of officers, ensuring that each unit
10

shares the same burden of shortages or overages in officer inventory. Under this system, commanders must
build their teams with whatever talent HRC assigns
to them.
Meanwhile, officers (who are also principals in the
assignment process) must do their best to perform
wherever HRC employs them, whether the job matches their talents or not. Again, we see differing interests.
Officers are seeking assignments that liberate their talent and allow them to make an optimal contribution to
the Army, while HRC is focused upon a fair distribution of overseas assignments and deployment exposure across the Officer Corps. In a recent survey, however, 44 percent of young officers identified “the job”
as their most important consideration when seeking
their next assignment. By comparison, only 6 percent
of them consider deployment schedules important.11
Solving principal-agent problems requires aligning incentives and reducing information asymmetries. Essentially, assignment managers need a way
of knowing what talents commanders need and what
talents are possessed by the officers they manage. Assignment managers must also be motivated to increase
both individual and organizational productivity via
information-driven talent matches. Until these issues
are resolved, the Army will continue to treat officers
as interchangeable parts, suffer low officer retention,
endure unnecessarily high developmental costs, and
perform suboptimally. Understanding some fundamental theories, however, can help the Army break
free of this industrial era employment paradigm and
move toward genuine talent management practices.

11

THEORY-TALENT MATCHING REQUIRES
BOTH DATA AND INCENTIVES
The theory of optimal job matching rests upon
three key assumptions. First, there is a heterogeneous
distribution of both employee talent and employer
requirements. Second, there is imperfect information
on both sides of any job transaction—neither the employer nor the employee knows whether a good talent match is at hand. And third, there is an incentive
mechanism that encourages talent matching for both
the employer and the employee.12
In our view, these assumptions hold when considering the possibility of a talent-focused Army officer employment system. First, all officers possess
varied and unique talent distributions, just as all officer requirements are varied and unique. In fact, the
uniqueness of both officers and requirements tends to
increase with rank.13 Second, asymmetric information
problems abound—officers have little visibility over
the preponderance of jobs for which they might be a
great talent match, and the Army knows very little
about the talent of each officer. Finally, it is in the best
interest of both the Army and individual officers to
match talents against requirements. The organization
increases its productivity without increased costs, and
the officer experiences enhanced productivity and job
satisfaction without compromising his or her career.
We can conceptualize the methods for achieving talent matches as lying along a continuum, from
“command directed” to “market driven” in nature. In
our daily lives, we are surrounded by evidence that
the operation of markets (with appropriate safeguards
in place) engender far more efficient and productive
outcomes than command directed processes do.
12

Recent world history reinforces the point. Compare
the U.S. and Soviet economies, for example. In 1945,
these two global superpowers both possessed significant quantities of heavy industry, natural resources,
labor, etc. By 1990, however, the Soviet Union’s stateplanned economy was barely one-third the size of
the American economy. In fact, the gap between the
two had been growing wider for years, despite Soviet
predictions that their industrial production and per
capita income would eclipse that of the United States
by 1980.14
Like the old Soviet economy, a rigid, centrally
managed approach to employing officers is woefully
inefficient and unequal to the needs of today’s volunteer force. It requires the Army to know exactly what
its future talent requirements will be—an impossible
task. Nearly as impossible, it tells people what they
will do and expects them to perform optimally in any
assignment they receive. This approach puts a premium on having adaptable (interchangeable) officers.
At the other end of the continuum is a regulated,
market-driven employment approach that would create incentives for officers (the labor supply) to volunteer talent information and for commanders (the labor demand) to identify talent requirements. In this
way, the Army could wean itself from reliance upon
error-prone requirements forecasts. Instead, it could
become a truly agile enterprise, better employing people within their unique talent sets. The Army’s Officer
Corps might then achieve genuine breadth and depth
of capability without requiring every officer to master
everything (the pentathlete paradigm).
To illustrate the way in which market forces can
help organizations meet unforeseen and rapidly
emerging talent requirements, consider Figure 2,
13

which compares undergraduate Middle Eastern studies by West Point cadets with graduate-level Middle
Eastern studies by Army officers.

Figure 2. Individuals in a Free Market
Respond More Rapidly to Changing Demand
than Command-Directed Enterprises Can.
Just as at any American university, West Point cadets can choose their programs of study. The solid line
shows how quickly they responded to the events of
September 11, 2001 (9/11). Almost immediately, the
number of cadets choosing Middle Eastern studies increased dramatically. An incentive is in play—young
men and women embarking on an Army career want
to bring relevant talents to their profession. The Army
(via West Point) affords these young people with the
opportunity to extend their talents. In return, it gains
much needed capability from people with both the tal14

ent and the desire to provide it. Both parties to this
exchange benefit rapidly and tremendously.
If every cadet wanted to major in Middle Eastern
studies, West Point would have to regulate this market
because the Army still requires engineers, economists,
historians, and experts in other regional studies. To
date, however, there has been no need for intervention in the selection of majors by cadets—the market
clears optimally.
In stark contrast to the example cited above, graduate level programs of study for Army officers are
centrally controlled and allocated. The dotted line in
Figure 2 tells the story. During almost a decade of persistent conflict in the Middle East, the Army did not
increase the number of officers enrolled in graduatelevel Middle Eastern studies. Perhaps this was due to
internal debate over the wisdom of doing so: Which
program study areas do we curtail if we allow more
officers to study the Middle East? Regardless, the
Army did not react, and an opportunity to increase its
cultural fluency in a critical area was lost.15
Top-down, centrally managed human capital
practices may have been sufficient during the relative
equilibrium of the Cold War era, with its industrial
economies, conscript armies, and clear adversaries.
They are unequal, however, to the needs of a volunteer force facing the twin challenges of a competitive
labor market and an increasingly complex global operating environment. Moreover, they are unnecessary.
Information age tools make it possible to capture a
great deal of information regarding individual talents
and unique work requirements, while market mechanisms can help the Army use that information with
telling effect. Instead of trying to forecast, for example, how many electrical engineers the Officer Corps
15

needs, the Army will know based upon the actual demand for that talent set.16
In addition, as Army talent demands become clear,
officers will be better able to develop the skills to meet
them. In cases where jobs require particular depth or
specialization, the Army may also consider extending
tenure to officers, both to increase their on-the-job development and to reap the highest rate of return from
extremely productive individuals with rare talents.
Market mechanisms incentivize employees and
employers to provide granular data on their respective talents and requirements. This is critical to creating optimal job matches. The more granular the
information, the greater the advantage one potential
employee has over another for a particular job. Accuracy is encouraged as well—careless mistakes or
deliberate falsification of information can lead to poor
job matches that effectively end an officer’s career.
This level of detailed information can introduce an
entirely new component to officer evaluations. Currently, all officers, regardless of rank, position, branch,
location, tenure, span of responsibilities, etc., are evaluated against identical performance measures via the
Officer Evaluation Report (OER). However, future
evaluations will be able to go much further.
Using detailed information about an officer’s talent
and the job’s specific requirements, commanders and
personnel managers will assess not just performance
but the strength of the talent match. Was the job a good
fit? If not, why not? How was the officer selected for
this position? What information was used to make this
assignment? What credentials are needed to succeed
at this job in the future?
Today, when an officer fails to perform optimally,
the Army holds the officer responsible, and the im16

plications for his or her career can be serious. In the
future, however, the assessment might read, “We put
him in the wrong job, now let’s get it right.”
TOWARDS A TALENT MANAGEMENT
APPROACH: GREEN PAGES
To test the theories described above, an innovative
new web application is currently being piloted on a
small scale among Engineer officers. Called simply
“Green Pages,” it is more than just a talent-matching
or employment tool.17 Green Pages proceeds from an
understanding of how markets work, why they fail,
and how they can be regulated. It also draws upon
behavioral economic theory—how people behave in
a marketplace and which incentives will move them
to action.
Currently, there is no market for officer talent in
the Army—no way for organizational strength managers and individual officers to make efficient talent
transactions. This represents a market failure—an inefficient use of resources when better results are possible. In other words, assignment transactions still occur, but there is a significant misalignment of talent
supply and demand, making the Officer Corps less
productive than it can be. Green Pages can rectify this,
providing the Army with its first market-driven officer talent management system.
Operating Concept.
Figure 3 graphically depicts the Green Pages
operating concept, simple in design but potentially
quite powerful in implementation:
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Figure 3. Green Pages Reveals Both
the Talents the Army Possesses
and the Talents It Demands.
Each person’s collective life experiences represent
tremendous capital in the Army talent market. When
officers participate actively in Green Pages (Figure 3,
point a), they will create detailed profiles summarizing all of their expertise, experiences, and accomplishments. More than just a listing of Army training and
skill identifiers, these include talents gained in college,
through leisure pursuits and hobbies, in their communities, in the civilian job market, and even from relationships with friends and family.
The Engineer pilot currently underway provides
excellent examples of the new officer information that
Green Pages is revealing, everything from what officers can do to what they hope to do.18 Examples of
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actual information already entered into the system
include:
• A captain who wishes to obtain his professional
engineering and Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design (LEED) certifications,
and plans on taking the Fundamentals of
Engineering Exam (FEE) this summer while
pursuing his masters degree in environmental
engineering.
• A lieutenant who interned throughout college
with an engineering firm building light rail
systems in the Southwest. As a civilian, he also
owned and ran a “green” business.
• A lieutenant who has extensive prior experience
as a project design and construction manager
in the Baltimore, MD, and Washington, DC,
metropolitan areas, as well as abroad.
These officers are sharing talents and goals in a professional setting, information which has tremendous
assignment utility and is not available to the Army
elsewhere. As you can imagine, a flood of other officer data, all searchable, will continue to enter Green
Pages, such as professional journal articles written,
heritage languages learned in childhood, productive
hobbies, publications, contingency experience, etc.
Simultaneously, commanders and strength managers at organizations across the Army will post robust job profiles, detailing not just required talents, but
desired talents. Just as individuals are unique, so are
work requirements. Even seemingly identical jobs can
differ based upon a variety of factors. These include
leadership styles, talent gaps, unit mission, other contingencies, geography, equipment, operating theater,
rules of engagement, etc.
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The Green Pages Engineer pilot is making this
abundantly clear. For example, a captain’s position at
Camp Zama, Japan, previously identified only by title,
rank, and branch, now includes desired civilian educational levels and academic disciplines. It describes
the work to be performed and the mission of the organization. It identifies professional certifications that
will help an officer excel in the assignment. It provides
a point of contact and a website where a job candidate
can learn more. Perhaps most importantly, officers
can consider their suitability for this job, whereas previously they may not have known it existed.
Once detailed personal profiles and job profiles
are entered into Green Pages, they will form the basis for a talent marketplace (Figure 3, point b). As officers and organizations search against one another,
the bulk of the talent market will “clear” optimally.
In other words, less intervention will be required by
actors outside of the talent transaction. HRC will still
be the assignments arbiter but will hopefully find itself more in the role of advocating for and approving
talent matches rather than balancing officer shortages
and deployment exposure.
Workforce talent matching will make the Army
more productive as officer talents are liberated by assignments that fit better than previously possible. This
will enhance relational coordination through teamwork and collaboration via information networks and
face-to face interaction. It will increase job satisfaction,
which has direct implications for retention. It will also
provide greater organizational agility as units gain the
breadth and depth of talent required to succeed in an
increasingly complex operating environment (Figure
3, point c). Green Pages will also allow officers to look
beyond their next assignment, to know what talents
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are in demand, align this information with their personal career preferences, and make the developmental choices that will posture them for the assignments
they desire in the future.
The talent market created by Green Pages will be
dynamic, both iterative and continuous, as new talents and new requirements are continuously fed into
the marketplace (Figure 3, point d). As granular information on the Army’s talent supply and demand
emerges, the Army can abandon static forecasting.
Instead, it will see in real time where its talent surpluses and shortfalls are and can rapidly adjust its
accessions, development, retention and employment
practices (Figure 3, point e).
Core Capabilities.
Green Pages is a “Web 2.0” application, and functionality is benchmarked from the best commercial
professional networking applications. It moves beyond those applications, however, which rely almost
exclusively upon user input (“how I see and represent
myself”) rather than official records (“how others see
me”). Green Pages combines both user entry information and official file information into a comprehensive
and searchable profile.
Green Pages also allows users to: manage the information that is publicly available about them as
professionals; search against every officer position in
the Army inventory; contact organization personnel
strength managers for more information; be found by
Army organizations conducting talent searches; collaborate with fellow experts from across the Army to
gather data, share files and solve problems; gain new
insights from discussions with like-minded profes21

sionals in private group settings; build professional
networks that can help them land the jobs they want
in the places the Army wants them; and, at the organization level, post and distribute job listings to find and
attract the best talent available.
Importantly, Green Pages is a relational database
tool, currently fed by several Army data sources. Over
time, it can easily draw upon additional data sources
to expand its searchable talent information, becoming
an increasingly more powerful tool in the process.
Changing Culture and Practice.
While we have described the more immediate benefits of Green Pages, those benefits will likely deepen
as the Army’s employment paradigm gradually shifts
from feudal to collaborative, from exclusively command-directed to increasingly market-driven. Over
time, Green Pages can usher in beneficial changes in
the Army’s work culture and practices.
By giving commanders greater voice in who is assigned to their organizations, for example, a regulated
talent market supported by Green Pages can help the
Army truly make Soldiers its centerpiece. Consider
that today’s commanders do not bear the cost of labor because it is “loaned” to them by an outside agent
(HRC). They take what they get and make do. As a
result, in today’s Army culture, commanders are held
more accountable for the operational readiness of their
pacing items than they are for the long-term career viability of their officers.
If a battalion commander averaged a 70 percent
operational rate for his tank fleet, he would leave command with his career in tatters. However, if 70 percent
of his junior officers left the Army at the end of their
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active duty service obligation (ADSO), there would
be no career repercussions for him at all. Why should
there be? It is entirely possible that these officers arrived to his unit fully intending to leave the service,
or perhaps were terrible matches for his organization.
If the bulk of these junior officers, however, were assigned to a unit because of their desires and the commander’s wishes, the equation (and the Army’s culture) would change. A moral contract is created, and
the commander is now responsible for developing
and employing young people that are serving with
him at his request. He has personally built the team,
and his investment in its success on a human as well
as operational level rises dramatically.
Green Pages may also change work practices by
engendering far greater relational coordination—frequent, timely, accurate, problem solving communication, connecting Soldiers around the world and across
time zones and operating theaters. Green Pages provides secure For Official Use Only (FOUO) communications tools: an internal email client, a professional
“Answers” module, and the ability to join “Groups”
and build a trusted network of associates.
Imagine serving as an engineer construction officer in Mosul, Iraq where you must drill several wells.
You have PDC bits, but due to unanticipated soil conditions you need a steady supply of roller cone bits.
Several local contractors sell them but they are of poor
quality and wear rapidly. Via Green Pages, however,
you are able to quickly locate an officer at Fort Lewis
who faced a similar challenge two years ago. He informs you of a great local supplier, one you were unaware of. You make contact, secure high quality roller
cone bits and triple your drilling speed, all because a
simple web application provided you with a rapidly
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searchable knowledge network to fall back upon. You
also become acquainted with an officer you never
would have known—his assistance is just the beginning of years of professional collaboration between
the two of you. Networked problem solving brings
remarkable organizational agility to the Army.
When natural disasters strike, such as the recent
earthquake in Haiti, Green Pages can help the Army
assemble the most talented response team possible.
A commander can immediately search for people by
cultural fluency, law enforcement, engineering, or any
other work requirements. He or she can search not
just official records, but officer-provided information
revealing relevant talents gained via leisure travel, a
religious mission, a Peace Corps stint, a Habitat for
Humanity project, advanced civil study, training with
industry, civilian employment, etc.
Perhaps more importantly, Green Pages may eventually span branch and component boundaries that
can be barriers to talent employment. Imagine that the
Army is responding to another Katrina-like hurricane
in the Gulf of Mexico. Unlike 2005, this time Green
Pages immediately identifies all engineers with levee
building and reconstruction experience. The Army
promptly dispatches these officers to the New Orleans
Corps of Engineers district. However, a talent gap
emerges—there are more officers needed than available. Another Green Pages search takes place, this
time focused upon specific engineering talents and
experience, rather than just Active Component “engineer branch” officers. The search reveals several certified engineers with the required geotechnical experience and credentials, to include one in the Mississippi
National Guard (an Infantry officer), another in the
Army Reserve who lives in Maryland (an MP officer),
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and several others. All are mobilized and deployed to
the crisis zone.
Potentially, Green Pages can reach all the way back
into new accessions to ensure the Army fully leverages
the talents of its junior officers and places them upon
the most productive and rewarding career paths possible. For example, via Green Pages the Army could
make officer branching decisions based upon far more
information than is available today (and on both sides
of the market—talent and requirements). Just as college graduates prepare resumes and interview with
civilian employers, prospective officers could engage
in a similar process with the basic branch they feel
best matches their talents.
CONCLUSIONS
Talent employment is at the core of the Army Officer
Human Capital Model. The Army’s current employment paradigm, however, is unequal to the needs of
a professional volunteer Army facing the twin challenges of a competitive labor market and an increasingly complex global operating environment. It unduly prioritizes “fairness” when making assignments,
has a narrowly defined pathway to senior leadership
ranks, cannot see the talent it possesses, and suffers
from severe principal-agent problems.
The Army must move beyond industrial era employment practices and adopt information age talent
management. However, creating better talent matches
requires a significant change in its feudal employment culture. Sound theories, information age tools,
and controlled market mechanisms can help the Army
match individual officer talents with specific work requirements.
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A carefully controlled talent market driven by
Green Pages is a win-win proposition. Commanders
win because they can seek the talent they need, screen
job candidates, and interact with both officers and
HRC personnel to achieve good matches. Officers win
because they will better know what talents are in demand. This can positively shape their developmental
decisions, future assignment aspirations, and professional networks.
The Army wins as well, and on several levels. First,
it can finally see the talent it possesses and the talent that is actually in demand. As talent gaps are revealed, it can allocate officer developmental resources
far more efficiently and rapidly. Second, the Army’s
Officer Corps will work in increasingly networked
fashion via Green Pages, building technology-enabled
problem solving relationships. Lastly, optimal talent
matches will improve talent development, enhance
productivity, reduce risk, and ensure the Officer Corps
has the depth and breadth of talent it needs, both now
and in the future.
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for the characteristic, not the demand for the individual possessing
the characteristic, which reveals the valuable information. See
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17. Green Pages was chosen as the name for this application
because it evokes the Army while also harkening back to yellow
and white pages, sources of information on organizations and
individuals.
18. Green Pages is being piloted with the Engineers because
the Chief of Engineers requested it. Over the last decade, the
branch has been sorely tested not just by war, but by simultaneous crises and humanitarian relief missions resulting from natural disasters in the U.S., Asia, the Caribbean, etc. As demand for
engineer officer talent has surged, the Engineers realized that the
current way of managing officers has not allowed them to respond as effectively as possible.
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